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ABSTRACT 
The boom of big data and predictive analytics has 
revolutionized business. eHarmony matches customers based on 
shared likes and expectations for romance, and Target uses 
similar methods to strategically push its products on shoppers. 
Courts and Departments of Corrections have also sought to 
employ similar tools. However, the use of data analytics in 
sentencing raises a host of constitutional concerns. In State v. 
Loomis, the Wisconsin Supreme Court was faced with whether the 
use of an actuarial risk assessment tool based on a proprietary 
formula violates a defendant’s right to due process where the 
defendant could not review how the various inputs were weighed. 
The opinion attempts to save a constitutionally dubious technique 
and reads as a warning to lower courts in the proper use of 
predictive analytics. This article explores certain equal protection 
and due process arguments implicated by Loomis.   
INTRODUCTION 
 On October 5, 2016, Eric Loomis’ council petitioned the United 
States Supreme Court for certiorari hoping to get a definitive answer to a 
constitutionally, and morally, troubling question: can a sentencing judge 
use actuarial risk assessments to help decide an offender’s sentence when 
we do not know what variables the formula uses?1 These assessments are 
commonly referred to as evidence-based sentencing tools and sold as 
software suites used by departments of correction across the United States. 
These assessments output an estimate of an individual’s future risk of 
recidivism based on statistical models built from data of convicted 
individuals gathered from correctional institutions. Different assessments 
use different variables supposedly correlated with a risk of future 
criminality. Some examples include age at first arrest and whether the 
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1 Loomis v. Wisconsin, No. 16-6387 (U.S. Oct. 5, 2016), available at http://www. 
scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/16-6387-cert-petition.pdf.  
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individual has ties to other criminals.2 The defendant’s specific 
information, gathered through face-to-face interviews and public 
information gathered by the state’s Department of Corrections, is entered 
into the software which then outputs an estimate of an individual’s risk of 
recidivating based on regression modeling.3 The tools have recently come 
under scrutiny, partially due to the former Attorney General Eric Holder’s 
public warning about their use in 2014.4 Proponents argue that they are 
scientific5 and statistically unbiased,6 and that judges should use all tools 
at their disposal when making sentencing decisions.7 Critics dispute these 
claims and question their constitutionality.8  
 This article does not evaluate all of the constitutional arguments 
that surround the use of evidence-based sentencing or their possible 
reinforcement of bias in the criminal justice system. Instead, this article 
considers whether the specific risk tool used in Loomis violates the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Constitution for its use of gender specific norming 
groups and the Due Process Clause because of its use of gender norming 
                                                     
2 NORTHPOINTE, PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO COMPAS CORE 27 (2015), http:// 
www.northpointeinc.com/downloads/compas/Practitioners-Guide-COMPAS-
Core-_031915.pdf. 
3 Part I infra explains in more detail how the process and models work.  
4 See Devlin Barrett, Holder Cautions on Risk of Bias in Big Data Use in Criminal 
Justice, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 1, 2014, 2:10 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-
attorney-general-cautions-on-risk-of-bias-in-big-data-use-in-criminal-justice-
1406916606 (“Criminal sentences, he said, ‘should not be based on unchangeable 
factors that a person cannot control, or on the possibility of a future crime that has 
not taken place.’”).   
5 Richard G. Kopf, Federal Supervised Release and Actuarial Data (Including 
Age, Race, and Gender): The Camel’s Nose and the Use of Actuarial Data at 
Sentencing, 27 FED. SENT. R. 207, 207 (2015) (“We must ask ourselves whether 
we wish to follow science, understanding that it may open up ‘terrifying vistas of 
reality,’ or whether we will ‘flee from this deadly light into the peace and safety 
of a new dark age.’”). 
6 NORTHPOINTE, supra note 2, at 15; see also Sam Corbett-Davies, Emma Pierson, 
Avi Feller & Sharad Goel, A Computer Program Used for Bail and Sentencing 
Decisions was Labeled Biased Against Blacks. It’s Actually Not That Clear. 
WASH. POST: MONKEY CAGE (October 17, 2016, https://www.washington 
post.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/10/17/can-an-algorithm-be-racist-our-
analysis-is-more-cautious-than-propublicas/?utm_term=.6f0b4aa73a1b 
(explaining in layman’s terms the disputed “bias” in COMPAS risk assessments). 
7 See, e.g., State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 765 (Wis. 2016), petition for cert. 
filed, No. 16-6387 (U.S. Oct. 5, 2016); Malenchik v. State, 928 N.E.2d 564, 572 
(Ind. 2010). 
8 See, e.g., Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific 
Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803, 821 (2014).  
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groups and proprietary nature. After explaining how tools like the 
Correctional Offender Management and Profiling Alternative Sanctions 
assessment (COMPAS) used in State v. Loomis9  are developed, this article 
concludes that it violates both equal protection and due process to use 
these tools during sentencing due to their reliance on group based averages 
and denial of any proper opportunity to contest the tool’s accuracy due to 
the algorithm’s proprietary nature.  
I. HOW COMPAS SCORES ARE CALCULATED  
A. Brief Overview of Actuarial Risk Assessment 
 Actuarial risk assessments can be calculated in many different 
ways, including using models relying on multiple regression, decision tree 
modeling, and simple summations inspired by the work of Lloyd B. Ohlin 
and Ernest Burgess.10 The tool used in COMPAS is likely based on a 
regression formula, meaning that the weights that COMPAS attributes to 
a defendant’s various characteristics is based on group averages. This 
conflicts with the jurisprudence that group based stereotypes, even if some 
statistical evidence can be posited in support of them, violate equal 
protection doctrine.11  
 In a standard linear regression model, some target variable is 
assumed to have a linear relation to one or more explanatory variables 
multiplied by some coefficient and an error term. The model finds the 
combination of weights given the inputted variables to minimize the error 
term. Solving for the coefficients shows that each weight is a function of 
the values of both the target variable as well as the different explanatory 
variables across all sampled observations. This shows mathematically that 
the coefficient is based on group data and averages. 
                                                     
9 State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 753 n.10 (Wis. 2016), petition for cert. filed, 
No. 16-6387 (U.S. Oct. 5, 2016). 
10 Eric Silver & Lisa L. Miller, A Cautionary Note on the Use of Actuarial Risk 
Assessment Tools for Social Control, 48 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 138, 139 (2002). 
Burgess suggested a simple linear summation where each variable’s weight was 
equal to one. See DON M. GOTTFREDSON & HOWARD N. SNYDER, NAT’L CTR. FOR 
JUVENILE JUSTICE, THE MATHEMATICS OF RISK CLASSIFICATION: CHANGING 
DATA INTO VALID INSTRUMENTS FOR JUVENILE COURTS 18 (2005), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/209158.pdf (providing examples of 
“Burgess-type models”).  
11 J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 141 n.11 (1994) (“Even if a 
measure of truth can be found in some of the gender stereotypes . . . that fact alone 
cannot support discrimination on the basis of gender . . . .”); see also Craig v. 
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204, 209 (1976) (noting the “normative philosophy” against 
“loose-fitting generalities” behind the equal protection clause). 
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 Logistic regression is similar to linear regression and is meant for 
categorical targets–meaning a variable that either occurs or does not, like 
whether someone recidivates.12 Risk assessments can then use the 
predicted coefficients to provide the weights for the risk score.13  
B. The Use of Norming Groups  
 The use of “norming groups” is common in certain areas like 
standardized testing in schools.14 Put simply, a norming group is a random 
sample collected from the larger sample of observations used to form the 
model.15 Essentially, the raw score provided by the model for any one 
individual is compared to the raw scores of a selected sample, or norming 
group, in order to gain insight into the individual observation in relation to 
a representative group. Without going into detail about the various 
methods of probability sampling,16 it is important to note that “there are 
[multiple] possible norm groups for any test” depending on what variables 
are used to select a norming group.17 Further, the rankings will differ 
depending on what norm group is chosen. Thus, “the composition of the 
norm group is [crucial when] interpret[ing]” the ranking.18  
C. How COMPAS Calculates Risk Scores 
 When using COMPAS, the defendant’s information is collected 
through a combination of face-to-face interviews with a member from the 
state’s Department of Corrections and information from the defendant’s 
criminal file.19 Since COMPAS is proprietary, the weights assigned to 
                                                     
12 DANIEL T. LAROSE, DATA MINING METHODS AND MODELS 155 (2006). 
13 See GOTTFREDSON & SNYDER, supra note 10, at 20, 21 (explaining how the 
predicted coefficients might be transformed and used in risk assessments).  
14 For a general overview of norming with test scores, see generally Maximo 
Rodriguez, Norming and Norm-Referenced Test Scores (Jan. 29, 1997) 
(unpublished manuscript), http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED406445.pdf. See 
also W. L. Bashaw, Assessing Learner Performance, in INSTRUCTIONAL DESIGN: 
PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATIONS, 151, 151–72 (Leslie J. Briggs, Kent L. Gustafson 
& Murray H. Tillman eds., 2nd ed. 1991).  
15 For example, COMPAS’ norming groups comprise observations from a sample 
of over 30,000 assessments made between 2004–2005 at various “prison, parole, 
jail and probation sites.” NORTHPOINTE, supra note 2, at 11. 
16 For explanations of sampling methods, see ELAZAR J. PEDHAZUR & LIORA 
PEDHAZUR SCHMELKIN, MEASUREMENT, DESIGN, AND ANALYSIS: AN 
INTEGRATED APPROACH 320–26 (1991).  
17 Rodriguez, supra note 14, at 4 (citing F. BROWN, PRINCIPLES OF EDUCATIONAL 
AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING (2d ed. 1976)).  
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 754. 
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certain variables and the type of model are not publically available.20 The 
practitioner’s guide gives some insight into what variables the different 
“scales” include, even if it does not provide the coefficients for each 
variable.21 The three “risk scales” are summations of various 
“criminogenic need scales” multiplied by weights corresponding to “the 
strength of the item’s relationship to” recidivism.22 For example, the 
practitioner’s guide provides that the Violent Recidivism Risk Scale is 
calculated as: Risk Score=β1*age + β2*(age at first arrest) + β3*(history 
of violence) + β4*(vocation/education scale) + β5*(history of 
noncompliance).23 
 The items labeled “history of noncompliance,” “history of 
violence,” and “vocation/education” are different criminogenic need 
scales, meaning a separate equation can denote each one.24 Again, those 
equations and weights are proprietary. The General Recidivism risk scale 
includes criminogenic needs scales for “prior criminal history, [affiliation 
with] criminal associates, drug involvement, and early indicators of 
juvenile delinquency problems.”25 
 A calculated risk score can be compared to the scores of a 
normative group that has been grouped in “ascending order” and then 
“dividing these scores into ten equal sized groups.”26 This provides the 
practitioner with a decile rank, where a lower rank indicates the offender 
has similar attributes as individuals who have a lower risk of recidivism 
                                                     
20 Id. at 761 (observing that Northpointe “does not disclose how the risk scores 
are determined or how the factors are weighed.”). Surprisingly, the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court denied an amici brief from Northpointe to help explain COMPAS’ 
accuracy and efficiency, despite neither the state nor defendant’s counsel being 
able to answer questions regarding the tool. Id. at 774 (Abrahamson, J., 
concurring). 
21 NORTHPOINTE, supra note 2, at 27–29, 32–46. 
22 See id. at 29 (explaining how risk scores are calculated using the Violent 
Recidivism Risk Score as an example).  
23 Id. This provides a basic idea of what variables are considered in the summation 
and resembles the kinds of summations detailed in GOTTFREDSON & SNYDER, 
supra note 10. 
24 NORTHPOINTE, supra note 2, at 38, 39, 44 (providing a brief description of the 
different scales). For example, the vocation/education need scale is a “amalgam 
of education attainment, vocational skills, job opportunities . . . [and] good 
income” among other variables. Id. at 44. 
25 Id. at 27.  
26 Id. at 11. Currently, COMPAS provides eight different normative subgroups 
based on gender and prison or parole populations. Id.  
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and a higher rank indicates the offender shares similar attributes as 
individuals who have a higher risk of recidivism.27  
 However, the deciles are only informative in that they compare 
the offender to the chosen normative group.28 If the norming group is not 
representative, the ranking will be inaccurate. This is where COMPAS 
incorporates gender–male offenders are compared to a male normative 
group and females to a female normative group.29 Instead of automatically 
lowering an individual’s risk of recidivism if female–or increasing it if 
male30–COMPAS removes gender as an independent variable. By 
comparing recidivism scores in gender normed groups, a man and woman 
with identical variables will receive identical risk scores but may still rank 
differently as to risk when compared to the norming group. 
II. STATE ENDORSEMENTS OF EVIDENCE-BASED RISK ASSESSMENTS  
 Numerous states use evidence-based tools at sentencing, and a few 
even require judges consider them when making decisions.31 Wisconsin 
severely limited the use of COMPAS assessments in Loomis.32 The court 
held that sentencing judges cannot use the risk scores to determine whether 
someone is incarcerated, as opposed to parole, or for how long they are 
incarcerated.33 Further, the judge must “explain the factors in addition to” 
the risk scores that “independently support the sentence imposed.”34 
Finally, the judge must be provided with a list of warnings explaining the 
limitations of the risk score, including that we do not know how the model 
determines scores, that it may “disproportionately classify minorit[ies]” 
                                                     
27 See id. (“It is important to note that decile scores can only be interpreted in a 
relative sense, and are always linked to the norm group.”). 
28 For instance, if the normative group is male murderers with a history of 
violence, a lower decile may not actually indicate a lower risk of violence. Id. at 
11.  
29 Id.   
30 There are numerous articles devoted to the fact that men recidivate at a higher 
rate than women. See, e.g., Michael M. Wehrman, Examining Race and Sex 
Inequality in Recidivism, 5 SOCIOLOGY COMPASS 179, 179 (2011) (“The 
probability of recidivating is not a randomly distributed event; men are more 
likely than women to recidivate . . . .”). 
31 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.007(3)(a) (2016) (requiring judges to 
consider risk and needs assessments); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 988.18(B) (2016) 
(requiring judges to refer to risk assessment if considering any kind of community 
punishment for felony offenders).  
32 State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 769–70 (Wis. 2016), petition for cert. filed, 
No. 16-6387 (U.S. Oct. 5, 2016). 
33 Id. at 769. 
34 Id. (emphasis added).  
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higher risk35 and that COMPAS “was not developed for use at sentencing” 
since it is not meant to identify a “particular high-risk individual.”36 
Despite these warnings, judges can consider the risk scores as “one of 
many factors” during their sentencing deliberations.37 These limitations 
are important since defendants do not have the ability to, in this author’s 
opinion, properly contest these risk assessments. The reports are given 
directly to the judge during sentencing, and although defendants have the 
right to contest any information that went into the model–unlikely since 
the defendant provided much of the information during the face-to-face 
interview–proving the assessment is imprecise without knowing how the 
models are formed is difficult.38  
 Indiana took a slightly different approach when it reviewed the 
risk assessment tool LSI-R–a close relative to COMPAS and what 
COMPAS likes to compare itself to.39 The court gave great weight to 
social science research supporting the tool.40 However, like in Wisconsin, 
the court continued to reiterate that the assessments were a “supplemental 
source of information” and not meant to decide sentence length.41 The 
                                                     
35 Id. An easy example of how COMPAS may classify minorities as higher risk 
can be seen with the variable regarding juvenile delinquency: certain minority 
groups have much higher juvenile incarceration rates than Caucasians. Joshua 
Rovner, Racial Disparities in Youth Commitments and Arrests, THE SENTENCING 
PROJECT (Apr. 1, 2016), http://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/racial-
disparities-in-youth-commitments-and-arrests/ (“As of 2013, black juveniles 
were more than four times as likely to be committed as white juveniles . . . and 
Hispanic juveniles were 61 percent more likely.”). Jeff Larson provides a more in 
depth analysis regarding COMPAS and the potential for racially biased 
misclassification. Jeff Larson, Julia Angwin, Surya Mattu & Lauren Kirchner, 
Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/art 
icle/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing. Jeff Larson’s follow 
up articles are available at https://www.propublica.org/site/author/jeff_larson. 
36 Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 769; see also NORTHPOINTE, supra note 2, at 29 (“An 
individual’s level of risk is estimated based on . . . offenders with similar 
characteristics.”). The court also included a warning that COMPAS had not been 
validated for the state of Wisconsin. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 764. However, a 
validation on a subgroup of Wisconsin inmates or parolees would do nothing to 
qualm the constitutional concerns of considering the offender’s gender.  
37 Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 769.  
38 This is discussed further at infra notes 57–58 and accompanying text.  
39 Malenchik v. State, 928 N.E.2d 564, 574–75 (Ind. 2010) (holding it was not 
discriminatory to consider a LSI-R report because the information used by the 
report was required to be presented to the judge by statute); NORTHPOINTE, supra 
note 2, at 20 (comparing COMPAS scales to the “gold standard,” LSI-R).  
40 Malenchik, 928 N.E.2d at 574–75.  
41 Id. at 573, 575. 
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court endorsed the use of risk assessment tools as a way to “design a 
probation program for the offender” and suspend sentences for low risk 
individuals.42 States’ limitations on risk assessments seem like an implicit 
acknowledgment of their questionable constitutionality.43  
III. DUE PROCESS CHALLENGES TO THE USE OF COMPAS’ 
PROPRIETARY FORMULAE 
 The Supreme Court has long recognized that criminal justice 
theory has evolved beyond treating every identical offense with the same 
punishment.44 In Williams v. New York, the Court emphasized the role of 
judges in crafting individualized sentences by “draw[ing] on information 
concerning every aspect of a defendant’s life.”45 It cautioned that the Due 
Process Clause should not be viewed as barring a judge from considering 
“out-of-court” information.46 Instead, considering outside sources of 
information–like a probation report–simply allows judges to make a “more 
enlightened and just sentence.”47  
 The Court has recognized several limitations to a sentencing 
judge’s discretion,48 including “sentencing . . . must satisfy the 
requirements of the Due Process Clause.”49 This generally involves 
ensuring the defendant is given the opportunity to contest, or explain, the 
evidence used against him and that the judge is unbiased.50 Lower courts 
                                                     
42 Id. at 573.  
43 See State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 757 (Wis. 2016), petition for cert. filed, 
No. 16-6387 (U.S. Oct. 5, 2016) (noting that the court imposed limitations on the 
use of COMPAS “must [be] observe[d] in order to avoid potential due process 
violations”). 
44 Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949).  
45 Id. at 250.  
46 Id. at 251. 
47 Id. at 250, 251. 
48 See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (“[A]ny fact that 
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must 
be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”); Gardner v. 
Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362 (1977) (holding that the presentence investigation 
report must be disclosed if it is considered by a judge who imposes a death 
sentence despite a jury recommendation of life in prison). 
49 Gardner, 430 U.S. at 357 (plurality opinion). The specific limitations imposed 
by the due process clause was controversial for the judges. For instance, Justice 
White believed the Due Process Clause was merely the “vehicle by which the . . . 
Eighth Amendment” applies. Id. at 364 (White, J., concurring).  
50 See, e.g., Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 (holding the defendant has a right to contest 
facts a judge relied on to increase the defendant’s sentence above the statutory 
maximum); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (“A fair trial in a fair 
tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.”); United States v. Gambino-
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have expanded on the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence to prohibit the 
consideration of “factors that could lead to unwarranted discrimination.”51 
 However, the Court has continuously restated that judges have 
wide discretion “taking into consideration various factors relating both to 
offense and offender” choosing a sentence “within the range prescribed by 
statute.”52 Further, although the plurality and concurrence in Gardner were 
conflicted in how the due process clause applies in sentencing, neither 
believed that all the procedural rights guaranteed at trial apply during 
sentencing.53 
 In general, due process protections during sentencing are more 
procedural than substantive. Unlike Gardner, Loomis provided the 
information used in the report and was able to see what variables went into 
the risk assessment. He could contest the truth of those variables during 
sentencing.54 Of course, without seeing how the risk assessment weighs 
the different variables, the ability to contest the inputs is a small comfort. 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court interpreted Loomis’ due process challenge 
regarding the tool’s proprietary nature and conceded that Loomis had the 
right to be sentenced based on “accurate information.”55 
 The Wisconsin Supreme Court interpreted “accurate information” 
to mean that the risk needs assessment must be statistically accurate.56 To 
                                                     
Zavala, 539 F.3d 1221, 1228 (10th Cir. 2008) (stating that judicial bias violates 
due process). 
51 See Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Recognizing Constitutional 
Rights at Sentencing, 99 CA. L. REV. 47, 55 (2011). 
52 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 481 (emphasis omitted). Despite acknowledging 
procedural and substantive protections during sentencing over time, Williams v. 
New York has never been formerly overturned. See, e.g., Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 
481; United States v. Mills, 446 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1124 (C.D. Cal. 2006) 
(acknowledging that although “Williams’s holding may be rendered questionable” 
because of subsequent decisions, it was never “explicitly overruled”).  
53 Gardner, 430 U.S. at 358 n.9 (plurality opinion) (“The fact that due process 
applies does not, of course, implicate the entire panoply of criminal trial 
procedural rights.”). 
54 State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 761 (Wis. 2016), petition for cert. filed, No. 
16-6387 (U.S. Oct. 5, 2016) (stating Loomis’ assessment was based on “his 
answers to questions and publically available data” that he “had the opportunity 
to verify”). Loomis also had the opportunity to argue that “other factors or 
information demonstrate” the risk score’s “inaccuracy.” Id. at 761–62. 
55 Id. This is derivative of the right acknowledged in Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 
736, 741 (1948) (holding that sentencing based on “materially untrue” 
assumptions of criminal history violates due process). 
56 Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 762–64 (explaining various validation studies of 
COMPAS Core).  
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the court’s credit, it provided studies that were critical of COMPAS as well 
as state validation studies that approved of its accuracy.57 The court 
recognized these scholarly disagreements in limiting the tool’s use.58 
 However, statistical accuracy should not be the measure of 
accuracy courts focus on. The validity measurements that these tools rely 
on, called area under the curve, relies on the ratio of false positives to false 
negatives. Essentially, the area under the curve indicates the likelihood 
that a randomly chosen observation is correctly listed as either higher 
probability or lower probability than another observation. The industry 
accepted standard is ROC = .70, meaning a defendant is correctly 
classified only 70% of the time.59 In other words, there is a 70% chance 
that any randomly selected higher-risk individual is classified as higher 
risk than a randomly selected low-risk individual. Inversely, there is a 30% 
chance that a lower risk individual will be ranked higher than our actual 
high risk individual. Because our criminal justice system is premised on 
the theory that “it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a 
guilty man go free,”60 basing sentencing decisions off a tool that 
incorrectly labels individuals at these rates is unsettling at best. 
 Sentencing is not merely a part of the criminal justice system, but 
the precise point where one’s liberty is infringed.61 Although one has been 
convicted at sentencing, our criminal justice system still provides 
protections for defendants through acknowledgment of due process 
protections. If the criminal justice system prefers type II errors over type 
I, then sentences should reflect the same sentiment that objectively less 
risky defendants should not be subject to overly severe punishment. 
Without knowing how the tool weighs variables, defendants cannot 
                                                     
57 Id.  
58 Northpointe strongly disputes the critique of COMPAS put out by Jeff Larson 
and ProPublica. However, both Northpointe and Jeff Larson have valid points. 
Their back and forth perfectly sums up the consequences of judging a statistical 
tool’s accuracy with statistics such as ROC ratios. Compare NORTHPOINTE, supra 
note 2, at 14–16 (arguing that similar AUC scores for different ethnic groups is 
evidence of validity), with Larson et al., supra note 35 (arguing that COMPAS 
resulted in significant racial disparities).  
59 NORTHPOINTE, supra note 2, at 17 (“By convention an AUC of 0.70 is regarded 
as good in criminal justice settings.”); see J.A. Hanley, Receiver Operating 
Characteristic (ROC) Curves, WILEY STATSREF: STATISTICS REFERENCE 
ONLINE, Sept. 29, 2014, at 1, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781118 
445112.stat05255/pdf  (explaining how ROC curves are calculated).  
60 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).  
61 See Hessick & Hessick, supra note 51, at 49 (“Sentencing is the process through 
which the state deprives those convicted of crimes of their liberty. Thus, the 
recognition of constitutional rights at sentencing is paramount.”). 
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properly defend themselves against the tool’s prediction. Discrediting the 
tool would require providing contrary statistical and sociological studies 
explaining why correlations acknowledged in the model are flawed or 
miscalculated in order to argue that they are falsely ranked high. Although 
the private company has an interest in its proprietary formula, that interest 
should not outweigh the public’s interest in a fair and effective criminal 
justice system if judges choose to use these tools at sentencing. 
IV. EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGES TO THE USE OF GENDER 
NORMING 
 The Supreme Court has never explicitly held that sentencing 
judges could not consider factors like race or gender.62 However, lower 
courts have recognized that considering these factors would be 
unconstitutional63 although these kinds of claims have historically been 
limited, or ignored, during sentencing.64 Whether risk assessment tools 
that use these variables would be upheld is unclear.65  
                                                     
62 See, e.g., Dodakian v. United States, no. 14-cv-01188 (AJN)(SN), 2015 WL 
11144511, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2015) (“Although the Supreme Court . . . 
ha[s] never held that gender discrimination in imposing a criminal sentence 
violates the Equal Protection Clause, it follows from the progression of equal 
protection [case law] that it does.”). Language in the Court’s denial of certiorari 
regarding Buck v. Thaler suggests the Court believes providing to a jury during 
the penalty phase of a capital trial evidence that certain races “are statistically 
more likely” to offend would violate the defendant’s constitutional rights. See 
Buck v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 32, 33 (2011) (Alito, J., concurring in denial of 
certiorari). 
63 See, e.g., United States v. Taveras, 585 F. Supp. 2d 327, 336 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) 
(holding that the court could not rely on defendant’s “race, ethnicity or national 
origin alone” as sufficient to implicate defendant in a gang, an “aggravating 
factor” for sentencing); Williams v. Currie, 103 F. Supp. 2d 858, 863 (M.D.N.C. 
2000) (“[I]nvidious gender discrimination [during sentencing] violates the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Hessick & Hessick, supra 
note 51, at 55 (“[C]ourts have forbidden consideration of race, national origin or 
gender at sentencing.”). 
64 Hessick & Hessick, supra note 51, at 84 (“[T]hese courts have nevertheless 
allowed consideration of those factors on the ground that any limitation on the 
information a judge could consider would impair the sentencing judge’s ability to 
arrive at the ‘correct’ sentence.”). 
65 Although Federal Sentencing Guidelines state that race and gender are “not 
relevant in [determining] a sentence,” U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, UNITED 
STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION GUIDELINES MANUAL 2016 § 5H1.10 (2016), 
comments accompanying a tentative second draft of the Model Penal Code’s 
sentencing guidelines suggest that while including race in risk assessments may 
be unconstitutional, including gender is likely not. MODEL PENAL CODE: 
338                DAMNED LIES & CRIMINAL SENTENCING [Vol. 15 
USING EVIDENCE BASED TOOLS 
 
 The use of data norming with representative subgroups thus poses 
an even more complex question of constitutionality. Gender norming 
removes the bias that would otherwise be included had a model merely 
included gender as a variable. This author is not certain that the typical 
equal protection arguments derived from cases like Craig v. Boren66 or 
United States v. Virginia67 would succeed. Part A lays out these 
arguments in detail and Part B concludes that intermediate scrutiny may 
invalidate risk assessment tools that use gender norming precisely because 
the concept behind norming is that individuals will act like the gender 
based norming group.  
A. Equal Protection Case Law and Gender Stereotypes 
 Classifications based on gender are subject to intermediate 
scrutiny, meaning they must “serve[] important governmental objectives” 
and the “means employed are substantially related to the achievement of 
those objectives.”68 Absent an “exceedingly persuasive” justification69 by 
the state meeting these requirements, the overt classification violates the 
Equal Protection Clause.   
 Protecting the citizenry through appropriate criminal sentencing is 
likely sufficient to be an important governmental objective.70 The question 
becomes whether stereotyping an individual based on group averages is 
substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.  
 The Supreme Court has historically decried attempts to justify 
gender-based classifications using statistical generalizations. For instance, 
in Craig v. Boren, Oklahoma argued that statistical inferences based on 
“random roadside survey[s]” and “analysis of arrest statistics” supported 
a ban on men buying a low alcohol beer instead of women because men 
were more likely to drink and drive.71 The Court criticized the studies72 
                                                     
SENTENCING § 6B.09 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2011). The 
reasoning for this discrepancy is unclear. If including race triggers heightened 
scrutiny, so would gender.   
66 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
67 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
68 Id. at 523 (quoting Mississippi Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)).  
69 Id. at 533.  
70 See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 264 (1984) (“The legitimate and compelling 
state interest in protecting the community from crime cannot be doubted.” 
(internal quotations omitted)). But see Williams v. Currie, 103 F. Supp. 2d 858, 
863 (M.D.N.C. 2000) (noting North Carolina had not provided any “important 
governmental objective to support discriminating . . . based on . . . gender” during 
sentencing). 
71 Craig, 429 U.S. at 200–03.  
72 Id. at 202 n.14.  
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and the lack of connection to the age-sex interaction the State sought to 
end.73 However, the flawed studies were likely irrelevant. In general, 
“proving broad sociological propositions by statistics . . . inevitably is in 
tension with the normative philosophy that underlies the Equal Protection 
Clause.”74 Thus, “loose-fitting generalities” based on statistics will not 
persuade the Court.75 The Court reiterated the impermissibility of gender 
classifications, despite statistical evidence supporting the classification, in 
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.76 
 Virginia expanded on Craig, stating that the “justification must be 
genuine” and “not rely on overbroad generalizations about the different 
talents, capacities, or preferences of males and females.”77 The State’s 
expert witnesses claimed that women and men thrived in different kinds 
of school environments, reflecting opinions on “typically male or typically 
female tendencies,” that would entail the end of Virginia Military 
Institute’s adversarial system if women were allowed to attend.78 The 
Court reiterated that courts should “take a hard look” at these sorts of 
generalizations79 and that the conclusion that VMI would have to adopt 
another learning method was unjustified,80 reflecting the kind of “self-
fulfilling prophec[ies] . . . routinely used to deny rights or opportunities 
[to women].”81 The Court has consistently rejected “group tendencies as a 
proxy for individual characteristics” in gender-based equal protection 
jurisprudence.82  
B. Applying Intermediate Scrutiny to COMPAS’ Use of Norming 
Subgroups  
 Tools that include gender as an independent variable lead to 
inequalities in sentencing that generally disfavor men.83 However, using 
                                                     
73 Id. at 203 n.16. 
74 Id. at 204.  
75 Id. at 209. 
76 J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 161 n.11 (1994) (“We have made 
abundantly clear in past cases that gender classifications that rest on 
impermissible stereotypes violate the Equal Protection Clause, even when some 
statistical support can be conjured up for the generalization.”). 
77 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).  
78 Id. at 541, 542 (internal quotations omitted). 
79 Id. at 541 (internal quotations omitted). 
80 Id. at 542 n.12. 
81 Id. at 543 (citation and internal quotations omitted).  
82 Starr, supra note 8, at 827. 
83 See id. at 837 (noting that risk assessments “produce higher risk estimates, other 
things equal, for subgroups whose members are already disproportionately 
incarcerated”).  
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norming groups may tend to disfavor women. Since men do recidivate 
more often, we would expect the average man in a prison norming group 
to have more prior convictions than the average woman in a similarly 
situated female norming group, and the risk scores are compared to these 
averages.84 Thus, a man with fewer prior convictions will likely be 
considered lower risk but a woman with identical prior convictions may 
be riskier compared to the norm group since we would expect the average 
woman in the subgroup to have less prior convictions.  
 Does this violate the Equal Protection Clause? There is a facial 
classification: men are only compared to men and women are only 
compared to women. The evidence-based sentencing tool generalizes that 
an offender’s gender affects whether the individual recidivates in the 
future. Although COMPAS does not assign a number value to an 
individual’s gender like other tools, the norming process does implicate 
stereotypes of gender-based behavior based on a defendant only being 
compared to a norming group of his or her gender.  
 Further, the norming process does not determine whether 
someone is objectively risky. Instead, it merely suggests that the person is 
more or less risky than another in the gender-based norming group. Is a 
woman that places in the upper decile of the female norming group riskier 
than a man who scored in the lower deciles? If the two had similar 
characteristics it would be nonsensical to say that a woman is riskier, and 
therefore requires more restrictive sentencing.  
 Under intermediate scrutiny, the State has the burden to show the 
classification is “substantially related to” achieving an “important 
governmental objective[.]”85  While maintaining an effective criminal 
justice system and reducing recidivism is arguably an important objective, 
there are alternate ways that do not rely on a gender-based classification 
using gender-based group averages. A judge could be presented with an 
evidence-based tool that omits gender completely. These models would 
not be as accurate as those that included gender, but if the point is to just 
                                                     
84 Northpointe acknowledges this kind of counterintuitive pattern is possible and 
should be reviewed carefully. NORTHPOINTE, supra note 2, at 30–31. Of course, 
the inverse may be true since women are generally sentenced less severely than 
their male counterparts. See Nancy Gertner, Women Offenders and the Sentencing 
Guidelines, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 291, 292 (2002) (“[B]oth before and after 
the enactment of the Guidelines, women offenders have been treated more 
leniently than male offenders.”). In which case, the women represented in the 
norming group may have riskier characteristics, because otherwise they would not 
have been sentenced to prison.  Again, the scores are only descriptive in the 
context of the norming group.  
85 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996). 
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show a spectrum of behavior and factors that correlate to increased 
riskiness, a judge could still get a similar sense of a person’s propensity 
for recidivism as compared to other individuals. After all, the judge knows 
the defendant’s gender; why is it then necessary to either bump up or down 
an individual’s risk score because of it? Additionally, past discrimination 
in the criminal justice system may be incorporated in statistical models.86 
Although statisticians seek to control for this, without seeing the model 
and its treatment of raw data, observers to the criminal process cannot be 
sure these discriminations are not merely self-perpetuating through the use 
of statistical modeling. In short, the proprietary nature of the model and 
seeming acceptance of false positives and negatives merely reinforces 
public distrust in the criminal process.  
 The State’s argument would hinge on the necessity of including 
gender to make the model more effective.87 But if the State was that 
concerned about statistical accuracy, race should be included as well in 
order to compensate for any bias in regard to race. However, most, 
including the ALI, believe this would be unconstitutional.88 Why would 
gender be different? It is unlikely that enhancing statistical accuracy for 
these reports would pass as an “exceedingly persuasive justification” for 
having the gender-based classification. For these reasons, the use of 
gender norming is likely not substantially related to the goals of criminal 
sentencing, especially since general reports on an individual’s riskiness 
can be produced without quantifying the effect of the person’s gender. 
 It seems more likely that the wide acceptance by trial judges is due 
to efficiency considerations. The prospect that a judge can receive one 
report that quantifies all the information scrawled across multiple reports 
and criminal files is enticing. But without knowing how the model is built, 
the possibility for impermissible discrimination based on gender in 
providing estimates of riskiness is unconstitutional and reflects another 
kind of generalization based on statistical evidence outlawed by J.E.B.  
Although the technique is less offensive than including gender as an 
independent variable, it is based on the theory that whether a person 
                                                     
86 Jeff Larson’s critique of COMPAS illustrates this rather well. See supra note 
58. 
87 Although this raises an interesting question: can the state proffer as evidence 
what is essentially on trial? The question is whether the use of gender-based 
statistics is appropriate. Can the state proffer alternate statistical analysis to 
support it? This kind of justification seems at odds with Craig and J.E.B. as 
discussed above at supra Part IV.A. For this reason, the State may wish to argue 
that gender is merely one part of the equation that is necessary for the model to 
effectively weigh other variables that are not protected characteristics. 
88 For further discussion, see supra note 65.  
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chooses to break the law again is partially based on one’s gender. This is 
an “overbroad generalization” like the kind lambasted in Craig.89 
 However, the limits placed on the tools used by the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court may save it from constitutional invalidation.90 The group 
of defendants most likely to be “harmed” by gender norming would be 
women who have similar criminogenic characteristics as male 
counterparts but due to the make-up of the norming group may be 
considered higher risk where men would be considered lower risk 
compared to the male norming group.91 But these defendants still have to 
show discrimination–and not receiving a lax sentence is likely not an 
appropriate harm in a noncapital context since it is well established that 
defendants do not have a right to a reduced sentence so long as it is within 
the given statutory range.92 It is hard to contemplate a situation where a 
defendant would have standing to claim discrimination when judges can 
defend their sentencing decisions by claiming their decision was based on 
other factors.  
                                                     
89 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976) (“[P]roving broad sociological 
propositions by statistics is a dubious business, and one that inevitably is in 
tension with the normative philosophy that underlies the Equal Protection 
Clause.”). But see Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984) (“[T]he harm to 
society generally may even be greater . . . given the high rate of recidivism among 
juveniles.”). The Court will not entertain basing generalizations and stereotypes 
based on statistics for protected classes like race or gender whereas it may for 
non-protected classes like age. See Buck v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 32, 33 (2011) (Alito, 
J., concurring in denial of certiorari) (noting that testimony stating a person’s race 
makes one statistically more likely to commit future crime would be a basis for 
the sentence’s reversal). 
90 But see Dawinder S. Sidhu, Moneyball Sentencing, 56 B.C. L. REV. 671, 726–
27 (2015) (“[T]he understandable preference for the positive use of actuarial 
instruments does not eliminate the very real possibility that these instruments may 
be used in both directions.”); Starr, supra note 8, at 840 (“There is no persuasive 
reason to believe access to risk predictions would only tend to reduce sentences 
rather than to also increase them in some cases.”). 
91 Because men have higher rates of recidivism than women it is possible that 
female norming groups would be composed of individuals who have lower rates 
of recidivism than their male counterparts. For further discussion on gendered 
differences in recidivism, see infra note 93 and accompanying text. See also 
NORTHPOINTE, supra note 2, at 29–30 (describing another scenario where a 
defendant would receive a counterintuitive risk score).  
92 Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977). 
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V. THE PARADOX IN BALANCING CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS 
AND STATISTICAL ACCURACY 
 To further complicate matters, some psychological studies suggest 
that women and men are driven to crime in different gendered paths.93 
Thus, an accurate model that predicts riskiness should likely include some 
interaction term(s) between an offender’s gender and criminogenic needs 
assessments. The theory would be that gender affects future decision-
making, and illegal behavior–an assumption at odds with Virginia, which 
rejected the premise that gender could dictate whether a woman would 
want to engage in and fulfill the requirements of the adversarial system at 
VMI.94 If studies have found race-based and gendered explanations of 
criminality, then a model that excludes these interactions is, by definition, 
not as accurate as it could be. It is unjust to sentence individuals based on 
a tool that constitutional protections require be less accurate than possible.   
CONCLUSION 
 In conclusion, despite state attempts at protecting actuarial risk 
assessments from constitutional scrutiny, heightened scrutiny should 
invalidate sentencing judges’ use of these tools because they rely on 
impermissible generalizations of gender. Further, defendants have due 
process rights to be sentenced on accurate information. If that means that 
defendants only have the right to be sentenced by a statistically valid tool, 
then the industry standard should be reevaluated and a defendant should 
have the right to contest the structure of the model itself. In order to 
effectively do so, the models cannot stay proprietary. A defendant should 
have the ability to provide evidence suggesting that the tools used against 
him or her are flawed–just as he or she would with any other piece of 
evidence. When the courts choose to use proprietary tools in sentencing 
against their stated use, the courts wrongly maintain the formula’s 
proprietary nature at the expense of a defendant’s right to a fair and 
effective criminal justice system.  
                                                     
93 See, e.g., Sarah Bennett, David P. Farrington & L. Rowell Huesmann, 
Explaining Gender Differences in Crime and Violence: The Importance of Social 
Cognitive Skills, 10 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 263, 273 (2005) (suggesting 
that gendered differences in social cognition development may explain 
differences in “delinquent behaviors”). One example is studies have found that 
males “have lower self-control than females” due to even “ineffective” parents 
being “more likely to control their daughters than their sons.” Brenda Sims 
Blackwell & Alex R. Piquero, On the Relationships Between Gender, Power 
Control, Self-Control, and Crime, 33 J. CRIM. JUST. 1, 3 (2005). This decreased 
development of self-control may help explain higher crime rates for men. See id. 
(providing examples of studies both supporting and disputing this theory). 
94 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 542 (1996).  
